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Abstract 
In the 20th century, Peru was one of the major fishmeal producers worldwide. Luis Banchero Rossi 
(1929-1972) was the main driving force behind this economic boom. This article discusses how, given 
a set of historical conditions favoring such a setting, Banchero’s business performance surpassed that of 
other Peruvian and foreign producers in the industry, and enabled this development. This research uses 
complementary methodologies; i.e., case study work and financial databases. The authors find that 
Banchero’s share in Peru’s total exports reached 15.3 % in 1968, far above the next largest Peruvian 
exporter. In this regard, Banchero operated his organization following a set of criteria, called market 
governance by Williamson, plus several advantages, including negotiation abilities, social capital 
formation, human capital management, and tacit knowledge development, building on Peru’s specific 
sociological conditions. These conclusions help understanding how an entrepreneur of humble origins 
like Banchero worked around a commodity such as fishmeal to become a successful business leader 
worldwide. 
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A man’s character is his fate. 
Heraclitus 
1. Introduction 
Peru has been a leading fishmeal producer since the beginning of the 1950s. Production grew 
119 times in 1954-1971 (Seminario 2015); and the average annual export volume increased 
from USD 0.8 million in 1950-54 to USD 188 million in 1970-73. Fishery exports surged from 
2.9% to 27.0% of total exports in 1960-67 (Thorp and Bertram 2013). Peru’s fishery boom was 
sparked by a critical set of historical and structural conditions: natural anchoveta abundance 
created by the Humboldt Current; high economic momentum in 1943-1976, on the back of 
demographic expansion, tertiary industry development, and mining growth; and the emergence 
of scores of risk-taking, innovative Peruvian and foreign fishing entrepreneurs. 
In this context, as a result of a spectacular industrial onslaught, by 1968 Luis Damiano Manuel 
Banchero Rossi produced 15.3% of total fishmeal exports, 2.6 times ahead of his closest 
Peruvian competitor (Abramovich 1973). 
How did this son of Italian immigrants, with no family background in the business, scarce initial 
capital, studies in a provincial university, and no English literacy become such a success story? 
How did this newcomer who did not begin to invest in fisheries until 1950 and was initially 
snubbed by the business community (whose arrogance he bitterly criticized) build one of Peru’s 
largest fortunes? (Malpica 1992). It has to do with the identification and implementation of 
innovations—using nylon instead of cotton nets, echo sounders to locate fish, and helicoidal 
impeller centrifugal pumps to transport catch from ship to plant—but also crucially with a 
creative use of tacit knowledge, social capital, and personal qualities. 
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This paper explains how Banchero’s historical and personal circumstances contributed to his 
achievements by using various methodological approaches (mainly the case study method, as 
well as close research of his life and times) and sources (the Economática corporate database 
system); and the Peruvian journal Pesca. 
2. Fisheries in Peru: economic and political developments (1959-1975) 
Peru experienced an economic boom in 1943-1976, with an annual average growth of 5.13% 
(Seminario 2015). At the same time, fiscal deficits remained high (above 10% of GDP in 1968); 
the foreign debt increased considerably to finance public works; and annual inflation exceeded 
two digits in 1957 (12.7%), 1965 (16.3%), and 1968 (19.2%). Moreover, in 1959-1975, six 
presidents came to power. One of them, Juan Velasco Alvarado, nationalized fishing 
companies. 
FIGURE 1. Fishmeal statistics 
Source: Compiled by the authors from Seminario 2015, Portocarrero 1992, Brundenius, 1973.  
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A major driver of this economic momentum was fishmeal production, which gained importance 
in international markets as livestock feed and offset the fall of other commodities—like bird 
manure fertilizer (guano)—within Peru’s commodity exports. 
In 1955-1972, fishmeal prices fluctuated between a high of USD 261/ton and a low of USD 
86/ton, with a standard deviation of USD 51/ton (Figure 1). Along with Angola, Norway, South 
Africa, the U.S., Denmark, Spain, Iceland, and Portugal, in 1960 Peru joined the Fishmeal 
Exporters’ Organization (FEO), which promoted strategies to hedge against market volatility. 
In the same year, the industry’s main stakeholders founded Peru’s Fishing Consortium 
(Consorcio Pesquero del Perú) to organize fishmeal exports, fight speculation, and establish a 
distribution system. Up to 92.5% of fishmeal production was controlled by the Consortium 
(Thorndike 2019). 
Fishmeal production almost doubled yearly in 1955-1960 and reached a historical high of 
2,249.247 tons in 1970 (5.16% of GDP, compared with less than 0.5% in 1955). Exports surged 
to a peak in 1969 (36% of total exports). During this period, Luis Banchero Rossi became a 
main figure behind the fishmeal boom and reputedly built one of Peru’s largest fortunes. The 
next sections suggest that this claim may be overstated. 
3. Banchero Rossi: entrepreneur, innovator, and strategist 
Luis Banchero Rossi was born on October 11, 1929 in Tacna (Peru). His parents, both 
immigrants from the village of Carsi (Italy), ran a vineyard and a wine-and-pisco mill. He had 
a brother and two sisters. When he graduated from high school, he left the parental home due 
to differences with his father. He settled in the city of Trujillo, where his uncle Benito Rossi 
Sattui—his mother’s brother, also an immigrant—encouraged him to study chemical 
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engineering at the local university. Graduation remained an unfulfilled goal that stalked him 
throughout his life despite his business success, until he finally obtained his degree much later, 
at 42, just two months before his untimely death in 1971 (Rossi 2011, 15-16). 
A born businessman, he started out selling soap as a college student. On one occasion, his 
cousin Mario Rossi, Benito Rossi Sattui’s son, also a chemical engineering student, set out to 
make soap, which had become temporarily scarce in the market. He judged his experiment a 
failure, but Luis took the soap and succeeded in selling it. He then asked Mario and his 
classmates to make more despite their material limitations and rudimentary production 
techniques (Thorndike 1980, 56-57). 
Having completed his studies at the age of 21 in 1951, he embarked in several business ventures 
with his cousin Alicia Rossi de la Riva, Benito Rossi Sattui’s daughter. While selling Kendall 
tractors and lubricants in Peru’s northern estates, he befriended Yugoslavian immigrant 
Radovan Samardzic, also a lubricant seller. Further pursuing business opportunities, he began 
selling liquor, including at the important Laredo plantation, where he became acquainted with 
engineer Isidoro Loebl. He realized that molasses (a by-product of sugar refining) could serve 
as livestock feed. Banchero took the risk: “I’ll buy all the waste” (Thorndike 1980, 68; Rossi 
2011, 16). When his bid proved successful, he founded the Productos y Forrajes company. He 
also became lubricant supplier to a fish canning plant located in the fishing locality of Coishco, 
near the city of Chimbote, where his cousin Mario Rossi, now a chemical engineer, was in 
charge of quality control. In Chimbote he developed a close partnership with Galician 
immigrants Fernando and Luis Pazos Caeiro, who introduced him to the vast potential of Peru’s 
fishing industry (Rossi 2011, 16). 
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Banchero also befriended Juan Sagarvarría, a chemical engineer of Basque and Italian descent. 
Sagarvarría worked with his brother in law, who owned the Envasadora Chimbote company; 
and also willingly shared his experience in fisheries with Banchero. Shortly afterwards, in 1955, 
Banchero decided to make a push into the nascent fish canning industry by creating Compañía 
Pesquera La Florida S.A. He bought an inoperative plant subject to seizure for debt and took 
its assets to Chimbote, where operations began in October 1955 with logistical assistance from 
Samardzic, “always the right friend at the right time” (Rossi 2011, 17). He also succeeded in 
engaging Carlos A. Mannucci (a Trujillo businessman of Italian descent) and Ignacio de la Riva 
(married to his cousin Alicia Rossi) in the venture. 
In 1955 fishery industries were incipient, consisting mainly of bonito canning for export, but 
also anchoveta fishmeal, pioneered by Manuel Elguera McParlin, Miguel Capurro and other 
entrepreneurs like Manuel Almenara. In 1945 the latter founded the Chimbote-based Compañía 
Pesquera Coishco, to which Banchero was originally a supplier of motor lubricants (Cushman 
2018, 431). Chimbote was thus gradually becoming a fishing center led by entrepreneurs of 
Italian and Galician descent, the latter mostly from the Spanish fishing port of Malpica (Rossi 
2011, 21). Soon, for logistical and other reasons, Banchero Rossi opened an office in Lima, 
located in a space provided by the manager of the lubricant company for which he used to work. 
Banchero Rossi, then 26, commuted weekly between Lima and Chimbote. Benito Rossi, his 
future biographer, was 21 when he enrolled in the new company (Rossi 2011). 
Bonito canning and anchoveta fishmeal plants mushroomed along coastal Peru throughout the 
1950s, including U.S. company Star Kist, which formed partnerships with Almenara and with 
the plants located in Coishco and the southern port of Ilo. The industry’s precarious conditions 
initially limited Banchero’s efforts to venture into bonito fishing: he depended on widely 
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fluctuating prices set by shipping vessel owners, as well as on their wooden ships (bolicheras) 
with no more than a 60-ton hold capacity. He then launched a 40-ton fishing vessel in November 
1956; and commissioned five more with the same hold capacity in 1957, as well as thirty-one 
120-ton ships in 1960. Previously, in 1959, Banchero had already made a daring move by 
commissioning the 130-ton ship “Tacna”, the first steel fishing vessel, followed by five more 
with the same hold capacity (Rossi 2011, 53). The latter could also serve as factory ships; but 
there were concerns about their ability to float and the corrosion of steel in seawater. The 
experienced Pazos Caeiro brothers came up with the solution: using galvanic current to weld 
ship parts. 
Banchero’s initiatives illustrate the push to overcome the industry’s incipient know-how and 
lack of technical sophistication in shipbuilding, fishing practices, transportation, and methods 
for unloading from fishing vessels to canning and fishmeal processing factories. Crucially, the 
process also involved identifying international market opportunities, disclosing Peru’s rich 
fishing potential, and investing exiguous capital in a timely and risk-savvy manner. 
Fishmeal was initially produced using bonito waste, but later there was a massive shift towards 
anchoveta promoted by Banchero and others. The year 1958 marked the beginning of the 
international fishmeal boom (as well as the decline of bonito fishing and a surge in South 
African demand for canned sardine and mackerel). Using facilities purchased from Californian 
investors at bargain prices, Banchero established a plant in Chimbote with a production capacity 
of 20 tons per hour, in partnership with US company Wilbur Ellis and Peru’s Compañía 
Industrial Pesquera del Pacífico Sur S.A. Taking advantage of a price fall, Banchero offered to 
buy Wilbur Ellis’s share in kind; changed the company’s name to Pesquera Humboldt S.A.; and 
named former classmate Alfonso Puga López as plant manager, as well as other college friends 
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(Rossi 2011, 16, 32). He also hired his brother-in-law, Orlando Cerrutti, a police captain, to run 
the operative and administrative areas. Rossi emphasizes that Banchero “[…] needed to appoint 
only men he could fully trust in places of responsibility.” (Rossi 2011, 32). At the same time, 
he closed down his molasses and tannery activities due to low turnover. 
After establishing fishmeal companies Pesquera Humboldt S.A. in Chimbote, Pesca Mar S.A. 
in Supe, and Los Ferroles S.A. in Callao, as well as canning plants La Florida S.A. and Miramar 
S.A. separately for tax purposes, OYSSA (Operaciones y Servicios S.A.) was created to 
coordinate operations and expansion plans for the Group as a whole. 
Mounting foreign demand had to be met by stepping up production, but within a framework of 
lean management, efficient logistics, daring innovation, and continuous learning. These 
materialized in a vertical integration arrangement involving a fleet and a shipyard of adequate 
size. Banchero had to develop sound decision-making and capacity building practices on the 
spot, as universities and other education institutions did not offer careers in shipbuilding, 
fisheries, or plant design. Initially Banchero’s brother-in-law, civil engineer Enrique Agois, was 
appointed as OYSSA general manager; but remained in that position only until 1962, as his 
conservative approach clashed with Banchero’s bold methods (Thorndike 1980, 48). As part of 
his plans to revamp financial and cost management practices, Banchero hired engineer Isidoro 
Loebl, former supervisor at Azucarera San Jacinto, whom he had met while doing business in 
northern Peru. 
Banchero’s logistical strategy included a comprehensive information system encompassing the 
accounting and operative areas. The efficiency gains from this approach resulted from 
coordinating costs and capacity in all the Group’s plants and vessels (approximately 200 ships, 
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3,000 fishermen, and administrative staff). The fleet needed to be equipped with radios, echo 
sounders, sonars, pumps, power blocks, etc. In 1959-60 nylon nets replaced cotton nets. Soon 
it also became necessary to establish a shipyard (Pesquera Industrial Callao S.A., PICSA) to 
build the Group’s own vessels, as well as a dry dock (Astilleros Chimbote S.A) for maintenance 
and repair (Rossi 2011, 59, 73). 
Fishmeal production costs were initially low: the cost was USD 50/ton, and the selling price 
could reach USD 150/ton (Thorndike 1980, 166); but price volatility and speculation remained 
serious drawbacks. In 1959, Peruvian producers confronted Comergal, a powerful international 
fishmeal trader owned by Spanish national Joaquín Peña. In addition to fishmeal produced in 
Angola, Peña speculated with Peruvian fishmeal supplied by a local company. He even visited 
Peru and offered Comergal’s trading services to fend off competition and secure a minimum 
price per ton, but negotiations failed (Thorndike 1980, 167, 168, 170-174). Around that time, 
the FEO was created in the context of the Paris Agreement (October 1, 1960) on the basis of 
the international market regulatory framework issued by the International Association of 
Fishmeal Manufacturers (IAFMM). Peru’s National Fisheries Association (Sociedad Nacional 
de Pesquería) adhered to the agreement; and shortly afterwards, on November 21, 1960, Peru’s 
Fishing Consortium was established, on Banchero’s initiative, to combat speculation, provide 
technical assistance, and ensure contract compliance. Peña’s speculation scheme consisted of 
selling in advance at a price below fishmeal production costs to break competition from Peru. 
After a 44-day standoff, with prices already on the rise, the Peruvian Consortium delivered 30 
thousand tons of fishmeal into the market at USD 115.00 FOB. Moreover, Banchero had 
previously carried out massive purchases of Comergal fishmeal from third parties at low prices. 
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Market participants began to purchase from the Consortium, marking a victory in the trade war 
against Peña (Thorndike 1980, 184, 185, 187-189). 
The Banchero Group implemented organizational improvements continuously. In 1965, the 
Fleet Manager’s Office was created and placed under the General Manager’s Office, together 
with the Production Manager’s Office. The Fleet Manager’s Office comprised the Operations, 
Maintenance, and Finance Departments, as well as the Research Unit. The Operations 
Department supervised the fleet chiefs and plant superintendents. The Maintenance Department 
team comprised mechanical engineers, electricians, electronics engineers, and refrigeration 
specialists. The Finance Department was in charge of budget preparation and implementation. 
The Research Unit followed up on world production statistics. Humboldt International, the 
Group’s maritime transport company, managed ships with a 10-ton hold capacity (Rossi 2011, 
60, 69). The OYSSA fleet grew to 191 ships: 145 anchoveta vessels, 18 bonito vessels, 21 
trawlers, 4 tuna vessels, and 3 auxiliary vessels (Rossi 2011, 79). As a consequence of this 
extraordinary expansion, in less than ten years Peru became the world’s leading fishmeal 
producer. Banchero was also keen to promote capacity building among his employees, for 
instance via the workshop for fishing vessel skippers, created in 1964 (Rossi 2011, 99). 
In 1966, the enactment of an export tax affected operations and provoked a strike. In addition, 
different sources indicated that the largest companies in the fishing consortium were 
responsible for ecological imbalances: the mass death of guaneras birds (Caravedo 1979). 
Moreover, the government declared a closed season for fishing in 1967. A political solution 
was found: Congress approved an income tax on profits and a reinvestment incentive. This 
reflected Banchero’s increasing influence on politics. In fact, by the end of the 1960s there was 
speculation that Banchero might run for president. However, on October 3, 1968, in a context 
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of political crisis, government corruption allegations in the media, hostile relations between 
Congress and the Presidency, and social unrest, General Juan Velasco Alvarado staged a coup 
and established a left-wing statist government. The relations between the regime and Banchero 
became increasingly strained. Banchero’s life came to an abrupt and violent end on January 1, 
1972. The reasons behind his assassination, which provoked widespread repudiation, remain 
undisclosed to this day. His extraordinary rise to success and his sudden death raised him to 
legendary status. His reputation as an austere, indefatigable man set him apart from the 
traditional upper crust; and earned him an almost prophetic and providential quality in the 
popular mind. 
4. The Banchero fortune 
How large was Luis Banchero’s fortune? Was he Peru’s richest man by the beginning of the 
1970s? His investment portfolio has been valuated and compared with other Peruvian fortunes 
of the time to answer this question. 
Although it is difficult to obtain the necessary data in a country with a rather shallow capital 
market like Peru, relevant information was obtained from the institutions and publications 
mentioned in the introduction to this paper. In Figure 2, companies marked with an asterisk (*) 
are associated with fisheries (production or commercialization) and operate under a vertical 
integration arrangement; i.e., inputs are purchased from their own suppliers and sold as 
transformed goods to firms also within the same Group. The only exception is the firm at the 
end of the production chain; i.e., the one that makes the final sale. 
All intermediate goods and services (fish, fishing vessels, nets, etc.) served to produce the 
exports made by Hamburg-based Humboldt International. For example, all ships built by 
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PICSA served only to export the Group’s fishmeal and canned fish. Although PICSA did sign 
contracts to sell five ships to French firm Pretabail, sixteen 600-ton vessels to Cuba, and five 
ships to Peruvian firm Pepesca, the 1973 nationalization prevented their delivery (Rossi 2011, 
125). These sales to third parties, which could have increased the worth of Banchero’s portfolio, 
never materialized. 
TABLE 1. Banchero’s portfolio valuation 
Banchero’s Portfolio (1968) USD thousands 
Fishing High Low 
Fishmeal 43,314 12,032 
Canned fish 11,832 3,287 
Sub-total  55,146 15,318 
Source: Compiled by the authors.  
We assume that a company’s equity (at market prices) can be estimated by multiplying an 
accounting indicator (sales) times a price sales ratio. The twin security chosen was Austral 
Group, a fishmeal exporter, with a 0.5-1.8 ratio. Banchero’s fishery-related wealth (i.e., 
fishmeal and canning) in 1968 USD is estimated at USD 15-55 million (Table 1). The Banchero 
Group included other interests like the Correo newspaper, the Seguros Panamericana insurance 
company, and the Defensor Lima soccer team. 
Although calculating Banchero’s worth is a complex exercise, it is possible to arrive at 
reasonable conclusions. The fortunes of Peruvian economic groups1 Romero, Wiese, Bentín, 
and Brescia in 1968 USD are estimated at USD 108, 101, 32, and 31 million, respectively. It 
should be noted that the latter are based on 1995 information from the Lima Stock Exchange, 
which does not include important unlisted companies. Clearly, the Romero and Wiese fortunes 
 
1 Only the share owned by the Group is considered. 
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were more important, with far more diversified investments in strategic sectors like banking, 
chemicals, mining, and hotels (Vásquez 2000). 
5. The distinctive advantage of the Banchero Group: market governance, transaction cost, 
social capital and embeddedness 
As discussed in the previous section, Banchero’s net worth was not one of Peru’s major 
industrial fortunes. However, after starting operations in 1955, by 1968 Banchero had become 
Peru’s first fishmeal producer, with a 15.3% share of total exports (Abramovich 1973). The 
second was Proteins Corporation, a US company; and the third was Madueño & Elguera, a 
Peruvian company (Roemer 1970), both well below Banchero’s output. The remainder of this 
section discusses the question advanced in the introduction: how did Banchero’s entrepreneurial 
performance surpassed that of all locally-based Peruvian- and foreign-owned companies and 
international corporations, starting from an exiguous capital, eventually becoming the largest 
producer in the world’s main fishmeal exporting country? 
The historical-structural circumstances favored the fishing industry as a whole, with 
entrepreneurs competing aggressively against each other. Therefore, in principle, the 
extraordinary growth of fishmeal production/exports over that period could have been basically 
the same without Banchero. 
The value-added process for fishmeal is relatively simple and imitable. Like in the case of other 
Peruvian commodities (e.g., guano and nitrate in the 19th century, or mining at the turn of the 
21st century), fishmeal production surged in a favorable economic and geopolitical context of 
rising demand and prices. In line with international trade theory, Peru’s fishmeal export boom 
relied on a basic endowment, a fish-rich maritime territory. Specifically, the Humboldt 
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current—which also cuts through an important segment of Chile’s territorial waters—creates 
rich nutrients for fish, notably anchoveta. Other factors include pseudo-scientific studies, the 
creation of the National Fisheries Association, and laws allowing anchoveta over-exploitation. 
By end-1953, ten fishmeal processing plants were already in operation (Cushman 2018, 428-
431). 
Therefore, Peru probably enjoys an absolute advantage in fishmeal production. There are no 
relative costs, but Peruvian fishers face low opportunity costs. The world fishmeal market can 
be described as an oligopsony, where few buyers (like Wilber Ellis, Coishco, and FIPECO) 
compete to purchase a given good. (Thorndike 2019). In addition to the historical factors 
mentioned above, technological conditions were more or less accessible to all entrepreneurs in 
the industry, depending on their economic capital or financing capacity. Fishing innovations 
included nylon (instead of cotton) nets, the echo sounder (which facilitates fish catch), and 
helicoidal impeller centrifugal pumps (which facilitate unloading fish catch from ships to 
processing plants). 
But why was a company like, for instance, Proteins Corporation—which had access to greater 
financial and managerial resources, operated under a fully integrated process, and was run by 
seasoned managers—unable to equal Banchero’s achievements and impose its dominance by 
sheer “brute force” (i.e., taking over the market by exploiting economies of scale)? A first 
hypothesis is that Banchero created competitive advantage by establishing vertical and 
horizontal links within a group of companies, i.e., what Michael Porter calls a cluster (Porter 
1991). This hypothesis assumes the ability to measure tangible resources and free trade. 
Moreover, development is explained by formal knowledge; that is, it can be expressed in words 
and numbers (cost-benefit analysis) and it is explainable (i.e., in can be expressed by a model). 
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However, the limitation of this framework is that it does not consider intangible resources, 
which are also fundamental in this case. 
So how did Banchero prevail over all other companies? How did he weather the successive 
crises that occurred during the 1960s? How did he compete against, and surpassed, all foreign 
and transnational corporations investing in Peru at that time? We suggest two concepts that can 
contribute to resolving this issue: transaction costs and market governance; and social capital 
and its embeddedness in Peruvian society. 
The transaction costs approach focuses on governance costs and relegates production costs to a 
lower priority. The issue is establishing whether the compartments generated by production 
should transfer resources as independent units via purchases or outsourcing (market 
governance), or under the supervision of a higher layer of authority (unified governance), 
thereby promoting vertical integration. Both mechanisms create different governance costs. The 
problem is deciding who controls production, the market or the company. Market governance 
originates market costs: data gathering, negotiation between the parties involved, and insurance 
and transportation for purchasing and outsourcing. Alternatively, under unified governance, 
costs are generated when resources are mobilized under the owner’s planning and direction. 
The difference between both approaches is the generation of transaction costs. A company will 
tend to grow until the cost per additional transaction within the company is equal to the cost of 
carrying out the same transaction via the market. 
If all agents were loyal, products were homogeneous, and information was complete, both kinds 
of governance would originate the same cost. However, in most societies there is opportunism, 
products are heterogenous, and information is incomplete. Therefore, costs differ between both 
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kinds of governance, but respond to three parameters: asset specificity, uncertainty, and 
frequency. On one hand, a less specific asset may be employed in different ways by different 
users without value loss, although, due to its simplicity, it will not generate significant benefits. 
On the other hand, a more specific asset cannot be used for alternative purposes, although it can 
take on a strategic behavior, thereby creating considerable gains. Uncertainty means that 
information is insufficient to protect an agent against fraud. Frequency refers to the number of 
transactions. Market governance implies equality of power between the negotiating parts, as 
well as anonymity. Costs are lower than under unified governance when products and 
technologies are simple (i.e., non-specific, general purpose assets); and economic agents have 
the same power over production factors. Information transparency makes it possible to trust 
anonymous agents, so that the costs of a rapid negotiation can be recovered more frequently 
(Williamson 1985). 
However, those were not Peru’s market characteristics in the 1950s and 1960s. Therefore, 
market governance was more suitable. The market governance mechanism allows lowering 
governance costs in the fishmeal industry. Fishmeal is a commodity traded in a primary, 
general-use sector. Its production process is not sophisticated and does not require specialized 
human capital. Moreover, its elementary activities (fishing and processing) involve simple, 
easily imitable technologies, which can hardly become differential factors. The production 
process does not involve specific assets, but rather a general-purpose asset (fish), accessible to 
other buyers via the market; i.e., it is not a differentiated product. It was not a Porter context: 
economies of scale were not required to diminish costs; and, at least initially, it was not 
necessary to implement production according to vertical integration criteria and under the 
supervision of a higher layer of authority, as in an integrated company. That was Banchero’s 
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choice, but it could have been implemented by any other entrepreneur under the same 
conditions. As evidence of this strategy, Banchero purchased an out-of-operation canning plant 
in association with two partners, Mannucci and de la Riva. Later, in the face of difficulties with 
the price of fish, he invested in fishing vessels (bolicheras): “The conflict within the fishing 
bourgeoisie between vessel and plant owners revolved around the price of anchoveta catch” 
(Caravedo 1979, 52). Banchero later hired engineers with experience in the mining industry 
(Roemer 1970), who did not required further technological specialization; and former 
engineering classmates, with whom he maintained a trust relationship that he used for the 
benefit of the company. He invested in his first fishmeal plant in partnership with, among others, 
a US subsidiary firm. Banchero responded to price falls by purchasing partners’ shares, in case 
markets took time to recover. He also shared piece rate payments to fishermen (who initially 
did not pay social security contributions) with other shipbuilders (Caravedo 1979, 53). He only 
implemented vertical integration when it was essential for sustaining production. Moreover, he 
played a leading role in the creation of Peru’s Fishing Consortium, a powerful lobby with the 
ability to pressure Peru’s Congress and Government, thus creating a 
monopolization/denationalization trend in the fishing industry (Caravedo 1979, 63, 64, 70). 
We maintain that, in implementing competition under market governance, Banchero developed 
particular personal skills, involving social capital and its embeddedness in Peruvian society, 
which allowed him to diminish governance costs more than any other company. This happened 
in a context where agents were not loyal and information was not accessible; on the contrary, 
Peru’s social and cultural environment in the 1950s and 1960s was marked by opportunism 
instead of loyalty, limited rationality, and scarce information on market agents. Banchero, as 
an entrepreneur, developed distinctive resources not confined to his professional, scientific, 
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technological, and academic knowledge. He developed inventive, innovative, and integrative 
skills (acquired from close friends, most of them of recent immigrant descent like him, and 
from fellow engineers with experience in the industry), which materialized in the exploitation 
of tacit knowledge and social capital. Banchero came through as trustworthy and able to 
articulate stakeholders’ interests in a fundamentally unstable political and economic context 
under an essentially corrupt National State (Quiroz 2013). He was a dealer with the capacity to 
negotiate prices more efficiently and obtain the best possible information in a society 
characterized by imperfect economic rationality and segmented social relations (which did not 
form a system as such). Banchero’s performance promoted a value chain that was key to the 
growth of his business. This strategy fostered confidence among Banchero’s employees, 
partners, and clients, who willingly shared the risks involved in his ventures. Such strategy was 
difficult to replicate, as it required a skillful management of both tangible and intangible assets 
(Barney 1991). It involved skills that were not learned theoretically or conceptually, but rather 
emerged from acting experience. This kind of learning is best encapsulated by the phrase: “We 
can know more than we can tell”. This is key to winning stakeholders’ trust and inducing them 
to follow the leader. It is an ineffable element (Polanyi 1966, 4; Spender 1993; Nonaka, 
Reinmoeller and Senoo 1999). 
Such entrepreneurs push themselves to absorb diverse forms of knowledge and venture into 
social contexts that are not fully integrated, but rather compartmentalized, involving diverse 
participants like fishermen, sellers, businessmen, engineers, technicians, and exporters. All 
those who played an important role in Banchero’s life—his immigrant family, his former 
engineering classmates, the fishermen who worked for him, the entrepreneurs he did business 
with—provided him with tacit knowledge, from the most basic experiences to the most 
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sophisticated technical practices, which he used to serve his vision. Social capital is formed by 
trust-based networks of connections aimed at performing transactions that can be beneficial to 
all parties (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). 
The literature on social capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998) indicates that social capital 
facilitates the creation of new intellectual capital through knowledge exchange and 
combination; that organizations, by sharing and transmitting knowledge, generate 
organizational advantage, where social capital sitting in social networks is a valuable element; 
and that access to such networks provides privileged information and opportunities, which other 
organizations cannot access, thereby creating comparatively higher growth in certain 
organizations. The evidence from Banchero’s case shows that social capital does not materialize 
just by being there. 
The literature based on Granovetter (1992) considers structural and relational embeddedness; 
and distinguishes between the properties of a relations network and the personal relations within 
a given history or biography. Relational embeddedness is important, as it brings individuals 
closer to their capacity of action or choice. This is relevant for understanding that other 
individuals with the same willingness to do business may start from the same structural social 
conditions; but only a particular individual attitude and strategic disposition to exploit social 
relations triggers certain responses from eventual and unsuspected stakeholders: relatives, 
former engineering classmates, close friends, fishermen, etc., as evidenced by Banchero’s 
biography. 
Building on Granovetter’s findings, Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) state that intellectual capital 
emerges from certain development conditions for social capital. In this regard, organizations 
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contribute to generating knowledge, which provides them with organizational advantage. 
Additionally, based on Polanyi (1966), Spender (1996), and other authors, it is possible to 
distinguish between tacit/explicit and individual/social knowledge. This classification admits 
combinations: individual explicit, individual tacit, social explicit, and social tacit knowledge. 
The first one can be stored and accessed specifically. The second one is of an automatic, rather 
practical nature. The third one is objectified, shared, collective, and laid out in texts and 
manuals. The last one (social tacit knowledge) becomes manifest in institutional practice and 
emerges from inter-relations that cannot be replicated by other institutions like a recipe. It 
assumes an embeddedness into the daily practice of an organization’s members. Entrepreneurs 
are coordinators of interests: they learn spontaneously—not explicitly, scientifically, or 
academically—to discover opportunities and identify market participants willing to sell or 
purchase. They develop a “know how” rather than a “know what”. They learn by doing and 
focus on action rather than objectives. They use a “knowing capability” to exploit opportunities 
by articulating interests. How do they transform this ability into a factor that makes 
extraordinary growth possible? 
The literature on social capital suggests that intellectual capital can be more valuable than 
material assets (e.g., land, money, or equipment). Banchero’s biography shows how this 
capacity translated into business growth by reducing transaction costs between stakeholders; 
and, more generally, articulating stakeholders who previously were not linked by a common 
interest. In this context, carrying out transactions implies mobilizing resources in a timely 
manner. This in turn implies identifying a community of interest within the organization; and 
between the organization, on one hand, and labor suppliers and buyers, on the other hand; as 
well as articulating supply of, and demand for, increasing output volumes. In the process, 
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transactions must be carried out in a timely manner between fish catching, processing, and 
exporting. Two critical elements in the production chain are catch volume and foreign demand 
for fishmeal. 
Banchero’s supply grew steadily and needed to be absorbed by the market. As a result of his 
ability to persuade fishermen to produce more, supply always exceeded demand. Spanish 
fishmeal magnate Joaquín Peña suggested to reach out to new buyers in Eastern Europe 
(Thorndike 2019, 170). Table 2 shows that Banchero succeeded in boosting Peru’s share of 
exports to Eastern Europe from 9.7% in 1958 to 23.1% in 1967. This was possible to a great 
extent thanks to Banchero’s push and initiative. 
TABLE 2. Fishmeal exports to Eastern Europe 
 Fishmeal exports to Eastern Europe (% from total) 
 1958 1963 1966 1967 trim I 
German Democratic Republic 0 3,7 9,1 5,7 
Bulgaria 0 0,2 1,3 0,9 
Chezchoslovakia 0 0,7 1,7 4,3 
Hungary 0 1,6 1 2,0 
Poland 0 0,8 4,4 5,1 
Yugoslavia 0 2,7 3,8 4,3 
Romania 0 0 0,8 0,9 
Total  0 9,7 22,1 23,1 
 Source: Pesca journal.  
This talent for articulating interests was based on his fiduciary capacity; i.e., offering wealth 
originated by products or services he did not possess or had not yet created. Therefore, a second 
feature of this tacit knowledge or know-how, when translating into growth, is its capacity for 
fiduciary generation; i.e., by creating trust among stakeholders with differing interests, 
Banchero was able to persuade them to enroll in his company or grant him unsecured loans. 
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This embeddedness of the company’s rationality into its network of relations via negotiation 
was not confined to finding common ground between conflicting interests within the industrial 
sector alone. It extended into the ability to develop broad and structural political connections at 
the government level and to exert lobbying pressure on Congress and the Executive. Very 
rapidly Banchero took the leadership of what Caravedo (1979) called the “fisheries faction”, 
which blocked the enactment of legislation against predation and the creation of environmental 
imbalances, among other benefits to the industry, a subject that was extensively discussed 
internationally at least since the 1940s (Cushman 2018). The “fisheries faction” was relatively 
successful during the Prado administration (1956-1962); but obtained considerable gains in 
1963-1968 by using influence to persuade the APRA-UNO congressional alliance to support 
initiatives opposed by President Fernando Belaúnde, leader of the Acción Popular party: 
The Belaúnde administration succumbed to pressures not only from social forces, which 
did not use congressional channels, but also from his own cabinet and Congress, where 
the APRA-UNO coalition held a majority (Caravedo 1979, 67). 
As a result, Law 15048 of 1964 favored domestic industry through tax cuts and preferential 
loans; and Law 16694 of 1967 promoted the creation of a domestic monopoly, led by Banchero, 
in partnership with foreign capitals, which drove small and medium producers out of the 
market: 
Within the SNP [National Fisheries Association], Luis Banchero represented 
monopolistic interests. He had political connections with certain sectors of the Acción 
Popular, Democracia Cristiana, and APRA parties (Caravedo 1979, 73). 
This is confirmed by Clarke: 
Within the fisheries industry […] APRA congressmen and senators participated in the 
“fisheries cell”, which successfully supported the interests of the industry in the complex 
congressional climate during the Belaúnde administration (Clarke 2018, 361-362). 
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Banchero’s spontaneous individual tacit knowledge articulated the individual tacit knowledge 
of fishermen (acquired from their work at sea) and salesmen; the individual explicit knowledge 
of technicians and engineers; and the social knowledge, both tacit (i.e., a sense of belonging 
and trust) and explicit (i.e., the contribution of engineers and managers in terms of economic 
rationality and market awareness). Paternalism involves an intense labor relationship whereby 
employers seek mechanisms to condition their employees’ decisions and autonomy. This 
leadership style may take three forms: benevolent (employers have a genuine interest in their 
employees and the latter develop a sense of loyalty); moral (employees accept a greater degree 
of authority from employers); and authoritarian (employees accept absolute and unquestionable 
authority from employers). Presumably labor relations improve, and organizational gains 
emerge, within the first two categories(Mussolino and Calabró 2014). The evidence suggests 
that Banchero’s leadership style qualifies as benevolent paternalism (Thorndike 1980; Rossi 
2011). Significantly, within and outside the organization, Banchero was known as the Man 
(Thorndike 1980, 136). 
At the same time, Banchero’s paternalism did not exclude extracting benefits from labor to 
serve the interests of medium- and large-scale producers (in partnership with foreign 
monopolistic capital); or participating in ocean predation: early on, Banchero established an 
alliance with APRA unions, known as the “mafia” (Clarke 2018, 362). Building on findings by 
Sulmont and Flores Galindo, Caravedo states the following: “The mafia that prevailed over all 
others in 1960-65 was the one run by Banchero ” (Flores and Sulmont 1972, 101-102; Caravedo 
1979, 58). In literature, José María Arguedas’s “El zorro de arriba y el zorro de abajo” 
(Arguedas 1983) provides a critical and harsh depiction of those times. 
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Banchero had an ineffable empirical knowledge of the behavioral patterns of diverse 
stakeholders. His talent for developing empathy across a range of social, cultural, 
organizational, labor, and professional environments proved instrumental in creating 
commitment towards the organization. Notably, according to Denis Sulmont and Alberto Flores 
Galindo, Banchero succeeded in establishing a seemingly horizontal relationship with fishing 
workers due to his ability to adapt the human resources practices of his companies to the 
mentality of his employees, thereby promoting camaraderie and esprit de corps. An important 
element in Peruvian fishermen’s mindset is an admiration for the “self-made man”, in addition 
to skill and cleverness. This close employer/employee connection is exemplified by initiatives 
like rewarding a number of workers by paying for their attendance to the 1970 Soccer World 
Cup; or finding time to join them for drinks (Flores and Sulmont 1972; Rossi 2011, 132-134). 
As the son of Italian immigrants, Banchero did not inherit authoritarian legacies from Peru’s 
colonial times. Flores Galindo suggests that the Spaniards’ vertical dominion over the 
population of native and African descent was preserved in Peru’s estates when republican rule 
weakened the political power of the clergy and provincial officials. With the oligarchy as the 
new political, economic, and social group in power, vertical authority gradually passed on to 
factories as urban centers became more industrialized; and the landowner/peasant paradigm 
morphed into an owner/worker relationship marked by social distancing (Flores 2001, 184). 
This tacit knowledge embedded in his personality and initiatives also translated into 
technological innovation and corporate bureaucratic streamlining: former Tacna schoolmates 
and Trujillo college classmates, Trujillo acquaintances, Chimbote fishermen (with whom he 
partied and drank beer), and immigrant partners combined and articulated their diverse and 
complementary knowledge within OYSSA. The organization reinforced previously weak 
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linkages. Over a short period (1955-1964) technological innovation accelerated, spurred by the 
constantly growing world demand for fishmeal, under Banchero’s bold leadership and 
increasingly sophisticated managerial model. The Banchero Group was among the first to adopt 
such innovations. Banchero’s fiduciary reputation extended beyond the organization and the 
stakeholder circle, to the point of being considered presidential material in his time and gaining 
iconic status among the Peruvian population to this day (Hernández 2020). 
Concluding Remarks 
In the 1960s, Peru became the world’s major fishmeal exporter due to a combination of 
historical, economic, and political factors. Like other Peruvian commodities (e.g., guano and 
nitrate in the 19th century, and currently mining), fishmeal production surged in a favorable 
international context. However, these economic factors do not explain how Luis Banchero, a 
Peruvian entrepreneur with incipient knowledge of industrial fishing and scarce initial capital, 
became Peru’s major fishmeal exporter, even surpassing foreign-financed companies. This 
article explains the strategy and capacities that Banchero developed to achieve such 
unprecedented success. 
Banchero used a market governance structure, which is a rational choice considering Peru’s 
conditions in the 1950s and 1960s: opportunism, uncertainty, scarce economic rationality, and 
absence of reliable information. At the same time, this alternative was perfectly imitable by all 
other competitors. In response, Banchero developed certain capacities that exceeded explicit 
economic knowledge accessible through institutional channels; and exploited elements of his 
own intellect and that of eventual stakeholders, especially tacit social knowledge within his 
organization, thereby generating organizational advantage and fostering trust and social capital 
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for the benefit of his companies. He also led lobbies and interest groups (e.g., the Fishing 
Consortium) connected with Peru’s Congress and Government, which promoted legislation for 
the benefit of the Consortium in general and his companies in particular. 
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FIGURE 2.  
 
Source: Compiled by authors.  
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